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Resumen  Tabla de Contenido 
There is a growing debate within the Philosophy 
community concerning the unity and diversity of 
explanation in neuroscience. The new Mechanist 
philosophy claims that neuroscience exhibits a mosaic 
unity in which models from multiple scientific fields 
contribute to the collective mechanistic explanation of 
an explanandum phenomenon φ by setting causal 
constraints on the space of possible mechanisms for φ. 
Non-mechanist philosophers acknowledge the 
relevance (even the centrality) of mechanistic research, 
but they want to emphasize the plurality and diversity 
of explanatory research programs in neuroscience. In 
this paper I argue, first, that the kind of explanatory 
pluralism many non-mechanist philosophers endorse 
—which I call ‘causally restricted pluralism’— is not a 
genuine alternative to Mechanism. Then, I present a 
liberalized interpretation of explanatory pluralism, one 
according to which there are models in neuroscience 
that contribute to the collective explanation of some 
phenomenon φ but that are not intended to set causal 
constraints on the space of possible mechanisms for φ. 
Finally, I review an explanatory research program in 
neuroscience, namely, efficient coding explanation, 
which is better accounted for by the liberalized 
interpretation of pluralism. 
 
Mecanicismo, Pluralismo Explicativo y Explicación de 
Codificación Eficiente en Neurociencia. Hay un debate 
creciente en la comunidad filosófica acerca de la unidad y la 
diversidad de la explicación en neurociencia. La nueva filosofía 
mecanicista sostiene que la neurociencia exhibe una unidad de 
mosaico, según la cual los modelos provenientes de múltiples 
campos científicos contribuyen a la explicación mecanicista 
colectiva de un fenómeno explanandum φ mediante el 
establecimiento de restricciones causales sobre el espacio de 
mecanismos posibles para φ. Los filósofos no mecanicistas 
admiten la relevancia (incluso la centralidad) de la investigación 
mecanicista, pero enfatizan la pluralidad y la diversidad de los 
programas de explicación en neurociencia. En este artículo 
argumento, en primer lugar, que el tipo de pluralismo 
explicativo que muchos filósofos no mecanicistas defienden —lo 
que llamo el “pluralismo causalmente restringido”— no es una 
alternativa genuina al mecanicismo. Luego, presento una 
interpretación liberalizada del pluralismo explicativo, según la 
cual existen modelos en neurociencia que contribuyen a la 
explicación colectiva de un fenómeno φ pero que no pretenden 
establecer restricciones causales sobre el espacio de 
mecanismos posibles para φ. Finalmente, reseño un programa 
de explicación en neurociencia, a saber, la explicación de 
codificación eficiente, que se entiende de manera más adecuada 
mediante la interpretación liberalizada del pluralismo. 
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1. Introduction
There is a growing debate within the Philosophy 
community concerning the unity and diversity of 
explanation in neuroscience. The new Mechanist 
philosophy claims that neuroscience exhibits a 
mosaic unity, one in which models from diverse 
scientific fields contribute to the collective 
explanation of an explanandum phenomenon φ, by 
setting causal constraints on the space of possible 
mechanisms (hereafter: SPM) for φ. For example, 
some mechanist philosophers claim that ‘cognitive 
science’, as traditionally conceived (cf. Marr, 1982), is 
on its way out and is being replaced by ‘cognitive 
neuroscience’, an interdisciplinary scientific field that 
aims to build multilevel mechanistic explanations for 
cognitive phenomena (Boone & Piccinini, 2016a; 
2016b) see also Piccinini & Craver, 2011).  
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Non-mechanist philosophers acknowledge the 
relevance (even the centrality) of mechanistic 
research programs, but they want to emphasize the 
plurality and diversity of explanatory research 
programs in neuroscience (Chirimuuta, 2014; 
Weiskopf, 2011). They denounce that “we are in the 
midst of a mania for mechanisms”, a mania that may 
lead to a kind of mechanism imperialism that 
“neglects the possibility that a system’s behavior can 
be explained from many distinct epistemic 
perspectives, each of which is illuminating” (Weiskopf, 
2011, p. 334).  
In this paper, I present the ontic interpretation of 
Mechanism (Section 2) and argue that the ontic 
interpretation of Mechanism is compatible with a very 
appealing kind of explanatory pluralism —namely, 
causally restricted pluralism— that some non-
mechanist philosophers have endorsed (Chirimuuta, 
2014; Weiskopf, 2011). Then, I introduce a liberalized 
interpretation of explanatory pluralism, one according 
to which there are models in neuroscience that 
contribute to the collective explanation of some 
phenomenon φ but that are not intended to set any 
causal constraints on the SPM for φ (Section 3). By 
reviewing an explanatory research program in 
computational neuroscience, namely, efficient coding 
explanation, I argue that efficient coding explanation 
is better accounted for by the liberalized 
interpretation of explanatory pluralism (Section 4).  
2. Mechanism 
In this section, I characterize the mechanistic 
perspective on explanation in neuroscience. What is 
Mechanism about? Some philosophers think that it is 
primarily a thesis concerning the vehicles of 
explanation (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Wright & 
Bechtel, 2007). Mechanists about the vehicles of 
explanation claim that the primary mode of 
presentation of explanations in neuroscience consists 
of models of the mechanism taken to be responsible 
for the explanandum phenomenon. A model of a 
mechanism aims to represent “its relevant 
component parts and operations, the organization of 
the parts and operations into a system, and the means 
by which operations are orchestrated so as to 
produce the phenomenon” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 
2005, p. 425). This thesis is intended to be an 
alternative to the covering-law ‘model’ of explanation, 
according to which explanation does not involve 
presenting a model of a mechanism but a logical 
inference from laws to explanandum statements.  
Other philosophers think that Mechanism is not 
about the vehicles of explanation, that is, about the 
representational format that scientific explanations 
take in neuroscience (Craver, 2015). Mechanistic 
explanations may be conveyed by mechanism 
schemas (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000), 
prototype vectors (Churchland, 1989), or abstract 
mathematical equations (Levy, 2013), just to name a 
few representational vehicles. Mechanism is, instead, 
a thesis about the truth conditions of successful 
explanations in neuroscience (Krickel, forthcoming). In 
order to make the truth conditions of explanation 
explicit, “one must look beyond representational 
structures to the ontic structures in the world” (Craver 
2015, p. 28).  
According to Craver (2007, p. 26), Wesley 
Salmon’s “most penetrating insight” was to notice, 
first, an ambiguity in the term ‘explanation’. In a 
sense, explanations are explanatory texts –scientific 
representations– that function as vehicles for 
conveying information about an explanandum 
phenomenon. As explanatory texts, explanations may 
be more or less speculative, empirically adequate or 
precise. Explanatory texts are the kind of entities that 
may be true or false. As epistemic products, they are 
“complex representations operated upon to generate 
knowledge and facilitate understanding” (Wright 
2012, p. 376). In another sense, however, explanations 
are worldly structures, objective features of the world, 
causal-mechanical patterns and regularities into 
which events fit. Considered as ontic structures, 
explanations are not the kind of entities that may be 
true or false. They just are. Secondly, Salmon’s 
approach offers insight into the idea that objective 
explanations (mechanisms) are the truth-makers of 
explanatory texts (mechanistic models). A model of a 
mechanism is explanatory of a phenomenon φ in 
virtue of representing some aspects of the actual 
mechanism that is responsible for φ. Successful 
models of a mechanism are ‘explanatory’ not because 
of their form but because of their true content, i.e. 
because they succeed in describing real aspects of the 
target mechanism in the world. This is what the ontic 
view of mechanistic explanation relies on (Craver, 
2007; Glennan, 2002, 2010; Piccinini, 2007; Thagard, 
2003).  
Against the ontic view, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
(2005, p. 424) remark that Salmon’s “important 
insight” is that mechanisms are real systems in nature, 
and hence “one does not have to face questions 
comparable to those faced by nomological accounts 
of explanation about the ontological status of laws of 
nature.” From an ontological point of view, 
mechanisms are less puzzling than laws of nature. But 
it is misleading to interpret this insight as implying 
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that the mechanism in nature directly performs the 
explanatory work. Bechtel (2008, p. 18) makes this 
point explicit when he affirms that “explanation is 
fundamentally an epistemic activity performed by 
scientists.” In the same vein, Wright (2012, p. 375) 
affirms that “the default sense of the infinitive to 
explain is a communicative one, pertaining to the 
transmission of understanding” and that “explaining 
some phenomenon φ involves operating on internal 
and/or external representations of φ to understand 
the how or the why.” From the epistemic view, to say 
that scientific explanations are mechanisms, or that 
mechanisms explain is merely to speak using 
metaphors of personification. Mechanisms do no 
explain themselves (Bechtel, 2008, p. 18). Sentences 
like: Mechanistic explanations involve mechanisms 
are explanatory claims in which the representation- 
and model-talk has been omitted from the 
construction. Some advocates of the epistemic 
conception of Mechanism emphasize that the 
justification of the ontic conception rests mostly on 
linguistic issues (Wright, 2012). Remember that 
Salmon’s (1984) main argument in favor of the ontic 
conception starts off asserting the lexical ambiguity of 
explanation. Wright (2012) replies that explanation, 
and other cognate terms, are straightforwardly 
unambiguous. Mechanisms ‘explain’ only in a 
metaphorical or elliptical way. I think that this reason 
against the ontic conception is irrelevant. The ontic 
view of explanation does not depend on any 
particular analysis of the ordinary uses of explanation 
in natural languages. The main tenet of the ontic view 
is that a model of a mechanism explains a 
phenomenon φ to the extent, and only to the extent, 
that there is a real mechanism that is the truthmaker 
of the model and that mechanism produces φ.  
I believe that the ontic view of explanation is 
essential to ground the normative mechanistic 
distinction between how-possible, how-plausible and 
how-actually models of mechanisms (Craver, 2006; 
2007). How possibly models are not purely 
phenomenal models of φ (i.e. models that merely re-
describe φ), but loosely constrained conjectures 
about the causal features of the actual mechanism 
that produces φ. How-possibly models may exhibit 
some kind of dynamical organization of parts and 
activities, but the modeler does not know whether 
those components are real or whether they are 
organized as the model describes. How-actually 
models, on the other hand, describe all and only the 
real parts, activities and organizational features of the 
mechanism that actually produce φ. In between how-
possible and how-actually models there are models 
that vary in their degree of mechanistic plausibility. Of 
course, mechanists accept that every useful model 
introduces some distortion factors within the 
representation of the target system, such as 
idealizations, abstractions, fictions, approximations, 
and so on. Thus, no model can be a how-actually 
model of a mechanism strictu sensu. However, the 
distinction between how-possible and how-actually 
models provides a normative ideal in light of which 
explanatory progress in neuroscience can be 
identified. There is a reasonable sense in which 
Descartes’s model of nerve action or Gall’s model of 
brain organs were how-possibly models that failed to 
become explanatory because there were found to be 
false, that is, because the actual mechanism that 
would have made the explanatory claims of those 
models true did not exist. The ontic conception of 
explanation is required to make this ‘reasonable 
sense’ explicit. Models may progress in the how-
possibly/how-actually continuum only if they 
represent causal components of an actual mechanism 
in the world. 
The mechanistic conception of integration in 
neuroscience also demands the ontic view. Craver 
(2007, p. 231) claims that “the unity of neuroscience is 
achieved as different fields integrate their research by 
adding constraints on multilevel mechanistic 
explanations” (see also Boone & Piccinini 2016a, 
2016b; Piccinini & Craver, 2011). Mechanistic 
collective explanations proceed through the 
accumulation of causal constraints from different 
scientific fields on the SPM for a given phenomenon 
φ. The SPM for φ contains all the mechanisms that 
could possibly explain φ (Craver, 2007). Single how-
possibly models are represented by points in this 
space; classes of similar mechanisms are regions. A 
constraint is a piece of information that shapes the 
boundaries of the SPM or changes the probability 
distribution over that space (i.e. the probability that 
some region of the space describes the actual 
mechanism). The dimensionality of the SPM is fully 
determined by the entities, activities and 
organizational properties that compose the how-
possibly mechanisms at all relevant levels of 
mechanism. The collective mechanistic explanation 
for the phenomenon φ is realized by the piecemeal 
accumulation of causal constraints on a common 
mechanism schema. If the target mechanism did not 
exist, then the whole explanatory enterprise would be 
wrong-headed and the diversity of scientific fields 
involved in that research program would not be 
successfully integrated.  
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3. Explanatory Pluralism 
In this section, I argue that the ontic 
interpretation of Mechanism is compatible with an 
interpretation of explanatory pluralism —namely, 
causally restricted pluralism— that some non-
mechanist philosophers have endorsed (Chirimuuta 
2014; Weiskopf, 2011). I have already mentioned that 
Weiskopf (2011, p. 334) encourages a view of 
explanation in neuroscience in which “a system’s 
behavior can be explained from many distinct 
epistemic perspectives, each of which is illuminating.” 
According to Weiskopf’s (ibid) version of explanatory 
pluralism, “[v]iewed from one perspective, the brain 
might be a hierarchical collection of neural 
mechanisms; viewed from another, it might 
instantiate a set of cognitive models that classify the 
system in ways that cut across mechanistic 
boundaries.” Similarly, Chirimuuta (2014, p. 148) 
recommends a kind of explanatory pluralism 
“whereby the same system in neuroscience can be 
represented and modeled in a variety of ways”. She 
claims that “these different perspectives on a system 
need not be in competition and may well be 
complementary” (Chirimuuta 2014, p. 148).  
The main motivation behind explanatory 
pluralism is that neuroscience deals with a system 
(the brain) that is extremely complex, by almost any 
standard (Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009). Modelers 
confronted with the task of theoretically representing 
the structure and internal dynamics of complex 
systems will usually adopt an idealization approach to 
those systems (Levins, 1966; Weisberg, 2006, 2007). 
The idealization approach is a reasonable alternative 
to a more ‘brute-force’ approach. The latter aims to 
build into the model as much of the target system’s 
complexity as possible, that is, they intend to build a 
model that is a “faithful, one-to-one reflection of this 
complexity” (Levins, 1966, p. 421). In the idealization 
approach, in contrast, the modeler accepts from the 
outset that some aspects of the explanandum 
phenomenon will not be incorporated into the model. 
In Chirimuuta’s (2014, p. 149) terms, when facing the 
challenges of complexity, “the standard scientific 
response is to simplify the problem space: restrict 
attention to a limited range of causally significant 
components and forget about trying to model all of 
them.” A natural consequence of the idealization 
approach is the proliferation of modeling 
perspectives about the target complex system, since 
each perspective may be useful to highlight different 
aspects of the complex system (Weiskopf, 2011). 
Explanatory pluralism is the attempt to normatively 
ground the proliferation of modeling perspectives 
that occurs naturally within the idealization approach 
to complex systems, such as the brain. 
Weiskopf (2011) and Chirimuuta (2014) put a lot 
of effort into saving explanatory pluralism from the 
perils of explanatory anarchism, a hypothetical 
philosophy according to which ‘anything goes’ 
(Feyerabend, 1975) in neuroscientific explanation. 
Abney et al. (2014, p. 3) remark that “explanatory 
pluralism does not imply the anarchistic idea that 
‘anything goes’: often, more than one approach is 
needed, but not all approaches are equally motivated, 
and many are even not warranted.” For these authors, 
explanatory pluralism must be restricted somehow in 
order to avoid explanatory anarchism. Weiskopf 
(2011, p. 336, my emphasis) argues that cognitive 
models in cognitive psychology gain explanatory 
traction by picking out real “strands in the complex 
causal web that winds through the brain.” Chirimuuta 
(2014, p. 128) argues that interpretative models in 
computational neuroscience “typically abstract away 
from many biophysical details of the neural system, in 
order to highlight dominant causal influences or 
universal behavior.” From these quotations, one may 
infer that Weiskopf (2011) and Chirimuuta (2014) 
think that models are explanatory to the extent that 
they convey information about the causal factors that 
produce or maintain the explanandum phenomenon, 
whether that information is mechanistic or not. 
Chirimuuta (forthcoming) explicitly accepts the 
existence and legitimacy of non-causal explanations 
in neuroscience. She argues that efficient coding 
explanation in computational neuroscience is not 
causal. The motivation behind this revision is that 
efficient coding explanation is seen now as a kind of 
distinctively mathematical explanation. In this paper, I 
focus on Chirimuuta’s (2014) arguments because I 
think that they express a version of explanatory 
pluralism that many philosophers may find appealing. 
In this sense, Weiskopf (2011, p. 335) asserts that 
cognitive models describe “real parts” of the complex 
causal system that produces the phenomenon, 
although the parts represented in the model are not 
“mechanistic” components of the system. I call this a 
causally restricted interpretation of explanatory 
pluralism. 
I believe that, in fear of the phantom of 
explanatory anarchism, ‘causally restricted’ pluralists 
may have granted too much to mechanists. I have 
indicated that the ontic interpretation of the idea of a 
mosaic unity is fully compatible with the proliferation 
of causal models about a target system. Part and 
parcel of the idea of a mosaic unity is that the findings 
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from different scientific fields are used, like tiles in a 
mosaic, to shape the SPM for a given phenomenon. 
Scientific fields are thought as groups of researchers 
related by central problems, experimental techniques, 
theoretical vocabularies and background 
assumptions (Craver, 2007; Darden & Maull, 1977). 
Some examples of neuroscientific fields are molecular 
neuroscience, molecular genetics, neurophysiology, 
neuroimaging, mathematical analysis, computational 
modeling and experimental psychology (Piccinini & 
Craver, 2011).  
From the mechanistic perspective, scientific fields 
are not bounded by intertheoretical reductive links, as 
in classical reductionism (Nagel, 1961; Oppenheim & 
Putnam, 1958). Mechanists accept that fields are 
autonomous to the extent that each is allowed to 
choose which phenomena to explain, which 
experimental designs to apply, which conceptual 
resources to adopt, and the precise way in which they 
are constrained by scientific evidence from adjacent 
fields (Piccinini & Craver, 2011). The ability of scientific 
fields to provide novel constraints on the SPM for a 
given phenomenon is grounded on their relative 
autonomy. Craver (2007, p. 231) adopts the 
perspective metaphor when he asserts that “because 
different fields approach problems from different 
perspectives, using different assumptions and 
techniques, the evidence they provide makes 
mechanistic explanations robust.”  
Mechanism encourages the proliferation of 
causal models about the mechanism targeted for 
collective explanation, since that proliferation 
contributes to the robustness of a mechanistic 
explanation. Causally restricted pluralism and ontic 
mechanism seem to complement each other. The 
upshot of sections 2 and 3 is that no matter how 
many modeling strategies you may find in 
neuroscience, no matter how different they may seem 
from paradigmatic mechanistic explanations, if those 
strategies are construed as providing causal 
explanations, then they can be interpreted as tiles in 
the mosaic unity of a mechanistic research program. 
In section 4, I explore a liberalized interpretation of 
explanatory pluralism, i.e. one according to which (i) 
there are models in neuroscience that contribute to 
the collective explanation of some phenomenon φ 
but (ii) those models do not set any causal constraint 
on the SPM for φ.  
Liberalized explanatory pluralism is an alternative 
to the central claim of mechanists, namely, that a 
model contributes to a collective explanation in 
neuroscience to the extent that it sets causal 
constraints on the target mechanism. A model that 
did not causally restrict the SPM would make no 
difference from a mechanistic point of view. A 
mechanist would say that such a model is, at most, a 
purely phenomenal model, a mere description of the 
phenomenon that does not carry any explanatory 
weight (Craver, 2006, 2007). My contention is that a 
liberalized interpretation of explanatory pluralism is 
the most reasonable approach to the nature of 
efficient coding explanation in computational 
neuroscience. 
4. Efficient Coding Explanation 
Chirimuuta (2014) argues that efficient coding 
explanation in computational neuroscience cannot be 
assimilated into the mechanist framework. Efficient 
coding explanations are provided by what Dayan and 
Abbott (2005, p. xiii) identify as “interpretative 
models.” In their textbook of mathematical 
neuroscience, they distinguish between descriptive, 
mechanistic and interpretative models. Descriptive 
models characterize what neurons and neural circuits 
do, so they are very similar to what mechanists call 
‘phenomenal models:’ their primary purpose is to 
describe phenomena, not to explain them. Dayan’s 
and Abbott’s ‘mechanistic models’ do what they are 
supposed to do according to the mechanistic 
philosophy: they explain how the nervous system 
operates, integrating constraints from multiple levels 
of mechanisms. Finally, interpretative models “use 
computational and information-theoretic principles 
to explore the behavioral and cognitive significance 
of various aspects of nervous systems function” 
(Dayan & Abbott, 2005, p. xiii). Interpretative models 
are purported to explain why nervous systems 
operate as they do, under the assumption that they 
are suited to the tasks they must carry out 
(Clatworthy, Chirimuuta, Lauritzen, & Tolhurst, 2003; 
see also Marr, 1982).  
Chirimuuta (2014, p. 127) mentions that the kind 
of explanation interpretative models provide “bears 
interesting similarities with evolutionary and 
optimality explanations elsewhere in biology”. The 
most conspicuous feature of optimality explanation is 
the use of mathematical techniques from the 
Optimization Theory framework. Optimality models 
represent and solve optimality problems, i.e., 
problems where the values of a given objective 
function on the set of possible solutions are to be 
maximized or minimized over a given constraint set 
(Sundaram, 1996). The objective function associates 
to each element of the set of possible solutions an 
element belonging to a totally ordered set of costs or 
values (Rosen, 1967). Crucially, optimality models 
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identify constraints on the set of possible solutions 
and tradeoffs among different costs or values to be 
achieved by the possible solutions. The problem of 
finding the optimal solution is then the problem of 
finding that solution corresponding to the minimum 
or the maximum value given the constraints and 
tradeoffs identified by the model. 
Chirimuuta’s (2014) case study of efficient coding 
explanation is Carandini’s and Heeger’s (2012) 
renaissance of Heeger’s (1992) normalization model 
of simple cell response properties. Heeger’s 
normalization model was proposed to explain non-
linear properties of neurons in the primary visual 
cortex (are V1 in primates). On the one hand, 
excitation of cortical cells is highly specific to contrast 
independent features of a visual stimulus: cells are 
selective to orientations, spatial frequency and 
direction of motion. On the other hand, cortical cells 
have a limited dynamic range: their response is 
saturated by high contrasts. How is it possible for 
response ratios to be independent of stimulus 
contrast, in the face of response saturation? The 
original idea of Heeger (1992) was that each simple 
cell receives linear excitatory input from the lateral 
geniculate nucleus and it also receives inhibitory 
input from nearby neurons in the striate cortex. 
Therefore, these systems operate a divisive 
normalization: they compute a ratio between the 
response of an individual neuron and the summed 
activity of a pool of neurons.  
Recently, Carandini and Heeger (2012, p. 51) have 
reinterpreted normalization as a canonical neural 
computation, that is, one of many “standard 
computational modules that apply the same 
fundamental operations in a variety of contexts.” 
Other examples of canonical neural computations are 
exponentiation, linear filtering and gain control. 
These “recurring building blocks” (in terms of 
Weiskopf, 2011, p. 249) of cognitive systems have 
been reported to operate in several sensory 
modalities and anatomical regions, from auditory 
cortex to areas correlated with visual attention. 
Normalization may have a different function in each 
of these regions (e.g., discrimination amongst stimuli 
or redundancy reduction) but in each case the same 
computation is performed, namely, “dividing the 
output response of a neuron by a term that relates to 
the average firing rate of nearby neurons” (Chirimuuta 
2014, p. 138). Furthermore, normalization considered 
as a neural computation is implemented by different 
biophysical mechanisms (such as synaptic 
suppression or shunting inhibition) in different brain 
regions. Thus, crucially, the phenomenon targeted by 
this efficient coding explanation seems to be multiply 
realized. The description of normalization that is 
relevant for efficient coding explanation does not 
demand a characterization of the biophysical 
mechanisms that implement the computation.  
Why is normalization so widespread? Caradini’s 
and Heeger’s (2012) answer this question by 
providing an efficient coding explanation of 
normalization. Chirimuuta (2014, p. 144) argues that 
efficient coding explanations take an observed 
behavior and formulate an explanatory hypothesis 
about its “functional utility”. In particular, Carandini’s 
and Heeger’s (2012) can be interpreted as arguing 
that “[normalization is so widespread] because for 
many instances of neural processing individual 
neurons are able to transmit more information if their 
firing rate is suppressed by the population average 
firing rate” (Chirimuuta 2014, p. 1430).  This exemplar 
of efficient coding explanation is strongly analogous 
to examples of optimality explanation in elsewhere in 
biology. An optimality model identifies, first, a set of 
variables that describe the target system, called 
design variables. Different values for the variables 
produce different designs of the system. Carandini 
and Heeger (2012) seem to identify the computations 
a system may perform (linear filtering, thresholding, 
normalization etc.) as design variables. Second, an 
optimality model identifies an objective function for 
the optimum design problem, which needs to be 
maximized or minimized depending on the problem 
requirements. Carandini and Heeger (2012) take the 
maximization of information transmission as the 
optimization criterion. Third, an optimality model 
specifies certain restrictions or requirements placed 
on a design, called design constraints. Crucially, an 
optimality model may also specify certain tradeoffs 
among different costs or values. Carandini and 
Heeger (2012) take the dynamic range of cortical cells 
as a design constraint. Finally, an optimality model 
identifies which values of the design variables 
optimize the criterion of the model in light of the 
design constraints. Chirimuuta (2014, p. 146) 
summarizes this explanatory pattern as follows:       
The general strategy is to work from information 
theoretic fist principles to build a model of a 
hypothetical system which would maximize 
information transmission of the sort required by 
the brain area in question. Then one sees how the 
hypothetical optimal and real system line up with 
respect to neuronal response properties and 
other features. If there are similarities in the 
properties compared, we have an explanation of 
why the brain area has those properties.   
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What is the nature of efficient coding 
explanation? I have mentioned that efficient coding 
explanation is usually provided by interpretative 
models. Chirimuuta (2014) holds that most 
interpretative models are minimal models, i.e. models 
that highlight only a subset of the target system’s 
features. More specifically, Chirimuuta differentiates 
between two kinds of minimal models. On the one 
side, there are B-minimal models. “B” is for Batterman, 
who introduced this kind of models in his (2002). B-
minimal models typically define a ‘universality class’. 
Two general characteristics of universality classes are 
the following: (i) “the details of the system (those 
details that would feature in a complete causal-
mechanical explanation of the system’s behavior) are 
largely irrelevant for describing the behavior of 
interest”; and (ii) “many different systems with 
completely different ‘micro’ details will exhibit 
identical behavior” (Batterman 2002, p. 13). Since B-
minimal models omit most causal/mechanical 
information about the target system, they do not 
seem to impose any causal restriction on the SPM for 
the phenomenon in question. On the other side, there 
are A-minimal models. A-minimal models “include 
only the core causal factors which give rise to a 
phenomenon”, that is, they contain “only those 
factors that make a difference to the occurrence and 
essential character of the phenomenon in question” 
(Weisberg 2007, p. 642). A-minimal models seem to 
be straightforwardly causal, thus they constrain in 
that way the SPM for the phenomenon in question. 
Are interpretative models more akin to A-minimal or 
to B-minimal models? 
Chirimuuta (2014) somehow bypasses this 
question and asserts that interpretative models 
constitute a sui generis kind of model, namely, an I-
minimal model. I-minimal models have two main 
features: (I) they “ignore biophysical specifics in order 
to describe the information processing capacity of a 
neuron or neuronal population”; and (II) “they figure 
in computational or information-theoretic 
explanations of why the neurons should behave in 
ways described by the model” (Chirimuuta 2014, p. 
143). She correctly cautions that any attempt to 
assimilate I-minimal models with causal-mechanical 
models would obliterate the defining characteristics 
of efficient coding explanation. However, she 
concludes in 2014 that efficient coding explanations 
are causal after all. The reason, which may be 
appealing to many philosophers, is that efficient 
coding explanations “delineate a set of counterfactual 
dependences between input to the system (e.g. 
sensory information) and/or system requirements 
(e.g. task for which information is needed) and the 
computational properties of the system” (Chirimuuta 
2014, p. 146). To the extent that interpretative models 
are able to address this kind of ‘what-if-things-had-
been-different questions’ (or w-questions; Woodward, 
2003, p. 221), they provide causal explanations. On 
this point I disagree. Chirimuuta (forthcoming) has 
changed her mind about the nature of efficient 
coding explanation in computational neuroscience. 
She argues that interpretative models do address w-
questions, but they do not provide causal 
explanations, because the relevant counterfactuals 
that answer those questions do not describe ideal 
interventions on the target system.     
In the first place, the capacity of a model to 
provide answers to w-questions by exhibiting 
counterfactual dependencies may not be grounded 
on the identification of causal relations within the 
target system. Lange (2013) claims, for example, that 
there are distinctively mathematical explanations in 
the empirical sciences that can address w-questions 
but not in virtue of describing the explanandum’s 
causes. Pincock (2012) provides a particularly 
beautiful example of mathematical explanation in the 
empirical sciences, reviewed by Lange (2013, p. 488): 
“Why has no one ever succeeded (or why did a given 
person on a given occasion not succeed) in crossing 
the bridges of Königsberg exactly once?” (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
The bridges of Königsberg in Euler’s time 
Euler’s mathematical explanation is that it is not 
the case that either vertex or every vertex but two is 
touched by an even number of edges. Although this 
explanation is clearly mathematical, it allows us to 
answer some w-questions, such as these: had John’s 
attempt to cross all the bridges of Königsberg exactly 
one begun on vertex D, he would have failed anyway, 
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or were there one more bridge and John’s attempt to 
cross all the bridges at once would have been 
successful.  
 In the second place, it is not the case that the 
information-theoretic constraints and tradeoffs that 
appear in efficient coding explanations are causal 
factors actually involved in the production of the 
explanandum phenomenon. Just like constraints and 
tradeoffs in optimality modeling elsewhere in biology, 
the information-theoretic constraints and tradeoffs of 
efficient coding explanations are not the sort of 
entities that participate in causal relations. Let us 
consider, for example, Harris’s and Wolpert’s (2006) 
model of saccade trajectories. They propose that 
saccade trajectories follow a stereotyped sequence 
because signal-dependent noise imposes a 
compromise between the speed and the accuracy of 
an eye movement and that the stereotyped sequence 
observed optimizes a tradeoff between the accuracy 
and duration of the movement. From an ontological 
point of view, tradeoffs like this are not events, nor 
causal properties within the system. Thus, the viability 
conditions that the speed-accuracy tradeoff imposes 
on the target system are not causes of the eye 
movement. 
In the third place, let us consider the link that 
Chirimuuta (2014) establishes between efficient 
coding explanations and Mayr’s (1961) ultimate causal 
explanations. The latter does not describe “a causal 
path leading to any current instantiation of the 
behavior or feature and so can easily be distinguished 
from local mechanistic explanations” (Chirimuuta 
2014, p. 147). The explanatory information an 
interpretative model provides concerns the 
synchronic mathematical dependencies between 
abstract information-theoretic tradeoffs and 
computations. Chirimuuta (2014, p. 142) claims that 
“the use of ‘normalization’ in neuroscience retains 
much of its original mathematical-engineering sense. 
It indicates a mathematical operation —a 
computation— not a biological mechanism”. These 
models do not attempt to represent the causal factors 
that produce or realize the phenomenon. 
If efficient coding explanations are not causal, 
how do they contribute to collective explanations in 
neuroscience? This is a very important and thorny 
matter, so I will only make some preliminary 
suggestions. I hold that most interpretative models 
are explanatory because they are general. Of course, 
mechanist philosophers are well aware of generality 
as an explanatory virtue of models. For example, 
Craver (2009, p. 588) accepts that computational 
models of the hippocampus, despite being abstract 
with regard to almost every neurobiological detail, 
can provide a genuine explanatory payoff relative to 
other, more concrete, scientific models: “For some 
purposes (such as building an abstract computational 
model) generality is more important.” However, 
efficient coding explanation (and optimality 
explanation in general) exhibits a kind of generality 
that is not identical to the kind of abstractive 
generality that characterizes mechanistic 
explanations.   
‘Generality’ roughly refers to the number of 
target systems that a particular model or set of 
models applies to (Weisberg, 2007). This notion is 
ambiguous, since it entangles two different 
‘components’ of generality together: A-generality and 
P-generality. A-generality corresponds to the number 
of target systems the model actually captures: P-
generality is the number of possible, but not 
necessarily actual, target systems it applies to 
(Weisberg, 2007). P-generality is the kind of generality 
that is often thought to be associated with 
explanatory power. I would like to add that there is a 
frequently overlooked distinction between two kinds 
of generality: mechanism-bounded generality (or M-
bounded generality), on the one side, and non-
mechanistically bounded generality, or ‘unbounded 
generality’ (U-generality), on the other. More abstract 
models of a target system, to the extent that they set 
some causal constraints on the SPM for a given 
phenomenon, are relatively more ‘general’ than 
concrete, detailed models of the target system. The 
exhibit high M-bounded generality. The degree of 
abstraction of these censored causal explanations 
correlates with their M-bounded generality, because a 
model may be applicable to more instances of the 
mechanism as it represents relatively less causal 
components. My contention is that efficient coding 
explanations exhibit a distinct kind of generality, 
namely, U-generality. A mechanism sketch is more 
general than more complete models of the 
mechanism in question, but is not necessarily more 
general than other models which represent features 
that range across several mechanisms. Interpretative 
model in computational neuroscience are U-general 
in that the design features they represent may apply 
across several mechanisms in the brain.  
It is fair to acknowledge that Boone and Piccinini 
(2016a) recognize en passant that some analyses of 
neural computation or information processing focus 
only on the information content and on the efficiency 
of a neural code, leading explanation outside the 
multilevel mechanistic framework. I think that it is a 
relevant datum for the debate between mechanists 
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and explanatory pluralists in the philosophy of 
neuroscience that the kind of explanation provided 
by interpretative models in computational 
neuroscience is distinct from mechanistic explanation. 
A mechanist philosopher may reply that the 
optimality approach is completely marginal or 
peripheral in neuroscience. It is important to 
remember that the center/periphery distinction is 
controversial. The tradition of optimality explanation 
in neuroscience has its roots in the works of Ramón y 
Cajal (1909). He first recognized that many aspects of 
brain organization can be accounted for by design 
features of the nervous system. Neuroscientists who 
advocate for canonical neural computations think 
that interpretative models in computational 
neuroscience are important tools in order to unlock 
the neural code and they even compare the search for 
canonical neural computations with the discovery of 
secondary structure in molecular biology (Caddick et 
al., 2009). 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that, contrary to the ontic 
interpretation of Mechanism, there is at least one 
trend of scientific modeling in neuroscience, namely, 
efficient coding explanation in computational 
neuroscience, that contributes to collective 
explanations in the discipline without setting any 
causal constraint on the SPM for the relevant 
phenomena. It was not my aim in this paper to deny 
that the discovery and manipulation of mechanisms is 
central to neuroscientific practice. The motivation of a 
liberalized interpretation of explanatory pluralism is 
simply a growing awareness that there is a rainforest 
diversity of explanatory styles in neuroscience, and 
that many of them are on an equal footing. 
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